### 1NC—Poststructuralists for Plan Texts

#### While the aff may have conveniently forgotten about the resolution, that little sentence says some important things. Here are some of them:

#### Resolved means to express by formal vote

Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary, 1998 (dictionary.com)

Resolved:

5. To express, as an opinion or determination, by resolution and vote; to declare or decide by a formal vote; -- followed by a clause; as, the house resolved (or, it was resolved by the house) that no money should be apropriated (or, to appropriate no money).

#### Resolved before a colon indicates a legislative forum

Army Officer School ’4 (5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### The “United States federal government” is the national government.

Blacks Law Dictionary, 7th Edition, 1999, 703

Federal government. 1. A national government that exercises some degree of control over small political units that have surrendered some degree of power in exchange for the right to participate in national political matters. – Also termed (in federal states) central government. 2. The U.S. government. – Also termed national government.

#### The resolution is not a license for the aff to talk about whatever they want; it is a calling from the Other, and Fullerton’s stance of affirmation is a promise to answer that call. By actively modifying the terms of this promise to suit their own interests and identities, they have reneged on this promise; the 1AC may have said a lot, but all the Other heard was a killing silence.

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Explicitly it is a matter of ‘speaking for those who . . . can no longer speak for themselves’ and in this respect of attesting to their suffering or dying because they cannot do so. Their suffering takes place ‘in secret’ and ‘after dark’, in ‘remote cells’ and above all in silence. And so language is required in order to ‘expose’ this violence and this suffering that without it would remain hidden and would continue to take place in silence. How though can one speak for the other without effacing his or her otherness, without silencing his or her silence in a speech that would take the other’s place and in which, therefore, it would be as if the other had not been silenced at all? While the implication here is that one could only do justice – or at least avoid doing this injustice – to the other by not speaking, by keeping silent and thereby keeping the other’s place, it is exactly because the other cannot represent his or herself that here one is called upon to speak. But since this is not the call for an articulate or ‘fine-sounding’ response, again: what is the nature of this demand for language and of the language it demands? These questions, I suggest, can be addressed and answered via a consideration of what Maurice Blanchot (1986) calls ‘the disaster’. Here, I am forced to simplify his account which concerns the fact that the disaster cannot present ‘itself’. The disaster ruins its own possibility for – like silence – it refutes or negates ‘itself’ as it ruins – or silences – the very terms in which it could be or be represented as a disaster. The disaster is so destructive that it destroys any trace of its occurrence. This is the immeasurable or incalculable extent of its disastrousness and it is for this reason that one cannot say or even decide that ‘there is’ the disaster. As Blanchot (1981) says of death: ‘when we die, we leave behind not only the world but also death . . . it is the loss of the person, the annihilation of the being; and so it is also the loss of death’ (p. 55). But what in this respect Blanchot goes on to call ‘the impossibility of dying’ – the impossibility of experiencing, or of being the subject of, one’s own death – is also true of a suffering that he says is less something ‘I’ go through than something that goes through ‘me’: ‘Suffering is suffering when one can no longer suffer it’ (Blanchot, 1993: 44). Above all therefore the disaster is so overwhelming that there can be no attesting to it. To present it or to represent it is to efface the very disastrousness that makes it a disaster. Thought, experience, language: all are inadequate to the disaster. How then can one bear witness to it? Or as Blanchot (1986) asks: ‘How can thought be made the keeper of the Holocaust where all was lost, including guardian thought?’ (p. 47, emphasis removed). For Blanchot, this ‘thought’ of the disaster does not produce a resignation to the impossibility of presentation or representation. Rather it imposes a demand or an obligation insofar as it ‘exposes us to a certain idea of passivity’ (Blanchot, 1986: 3). But this passivity bears the ruin and self-ruin that characterize the disaster. Its being is similarly impossible and so it is to this impossibility, to the idea of a ‘self-refuting’ passivity, that the disaster exposes ‘us’. I will come back to this. But now I want to indicate the relevance of this thought for the obligation to calculate that Derrida traces to the incalculability of justice, as well as for the relativist or postmodernist idea of difference indicated at the very beginning of my discussion. It is also a certain idea of ‘passivity’ that Derrida (2002a) takes up in the name of what he calls an ‘incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice’ (p. 257); an idea of justice that implies the sense in which ‘being just’ means being just or responsive or true to something in its difference or its singularity. 12 Again I will have to simplify Derrida’s argument which concerns the impossible realization of this idea in a decision that, as ‘finite’, would always interrupt or cut into the infinite calculation that justice requires (p. 255).13 Such a decision is for this reason always violent. But while it is never just, it is, for Derrida, nevertheless necessary. There is, he says, and here after Pascal, no justice before law: ‘Justice isn’t justice, it is not achieved, if it does not have the force to be “enforced”; a powerless justice is not justice’ (p. 238). ‘It is necessary then to combine justice and force’ and in accordance with this necessity ‘justice demands, as justice, recourse to force’ (p. 239, emphasis added). Derrida’s claim, therefore – and here it recalls the argument that silence requires language if it is to ‘be’ – is that justice can only come into ‘being’ in law, and as it is enforced by law. According to this force, law or the decision cannot be just. But what Derrida discerns here is a command to calculate or to decide that is – now recalling the fact that for Amnesty International the other can no longer speak for him or herself – ‘founded’ upon the fact that justice cannot present ‘itself’, that it cannot be ‘itself’, before or outside of law. Restated, Derrida’s argument here is that the ‘difference’ in the name of which (an extreme) relativism would reject human rights is, before any calculation, beyond its determination even as difference. ‘Difference’ appears as difference only if it has already been calculated, only if it has already been determined and so at the same time violated in its ‘difference’. Again, without this determination, without this decision, difference could not appear at all. And so it is according to this ‘decision’ – a decision that is as violent as it is necessary, as excessive as it is unavoidable – that relativism must also calculate; or, more precisely, it must have already calculated. Without law there can be no justice. And so one has to decide; one has to speak. Why? I am already at the most crucial point of Derrida’s argument: ‘Abandoned to itself, the incalculable and giving [donatrice] idea of justice is always very close to the bad, even to the worst’ (Derrida, 2002a: 257). To begin to explain this point, I return to Blanchot’s thought of the disaster: for the insight of this thought consists in the fact that as the disaster ruins its own possibility, so its occurrence, its presence, would be unverifiable. There would be no difference between its presence and its absence. And it is this unverifiability that Amnesty International invokes as the impossibility of interpreting or representing the difference between ‘one’ absence or silence and ‘another’. ‘You’ve probably never heard of the Marsh Arabs before. You probably never will again’; ‘Kids. You can never find them when you want them’. And so on. In this undecidable absence or silence, it is impossible to tell whether the disaster has, or has not, taken place. Again, it is impossible to tell the difference between its presence and its absence and it is because of this impossibility, I suggest, that in not speaking or deciding one comes very close to ‘the worst’. In this passivity, in this attempt to respond or do justice to the disastrousness of the disaster, one’s silence would constitute a ‘killing silence’ in the sense that it would be ‘complicit’ with the disaster (in its unverifiability). What Amnesty International refers to as ‘the silence of good people’ is, for them, ‘the deadliest enemy’ for this reason: exactly because it cannot be told apart from that non-response which reflects a lack of concern with the other’s suffering or with his or her death, and which results from a failure or a refusal to have been or felt touched by it.14 Unheard, ‘the silence of good people’ remains indistinguishable from a ‘silence’ – or more precisely an absence of silence – that does not ‘expose’ the other’s suffering and thereby allows it to continue in silence. For as Derrida (2002a) says, it is in its proximity to the worst that the incalculable and giving idea of justice can ‘always be reappropriated by the most perverse calculation’ (p. 257). In ‘silence’, silence cannot be heard at all. Or, after Blanchot, the passivity of this ‘silence’ would be so passive that it would be unable to bear witness to anything, even to its own passivity. Exposed to this idea of passivity, passivity exposes ‘us’ to its demand: for as Blanchot (1986) says, ‘passivity is a task’ (p. 27). It is only in speech or in writing that the ‘justice’ of one response can be distinguished from the injustice of none. And, against Scarry’s characterization, the language demanded by Amnesty International may be understood on this ‘basis’: already acknowledging its own inadequacy and its own imprecision, it is – recalling Derrida – the language to which silence, as silence, must have recourse.

#### Their failure to engage the topic is not benign—it is indicative of wider politics of avoidance which replaces technocratic instrumentalism with repetitive critique. This is disastrous for those caught in material networks of inequality—preference political engagement over theoretical hallucination.

Bryant ’12 Levi Bryant, teaches philosophy at Collin College, “RSI, Discursivity, Critique, and Politics,” Larval Subjects, 7/18/2012, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/07/18/rsi-discursivity-critique-and-politics/

If I get worked up about these issues, then this is because I think they’ve created serious lacuna in our political theory and practice. Suppose I focus on norms, for example. Great, I’ve developed a theory of norms and how they contribute to the social fabric. Yet while Kant claims that “ought implies can”, I’m not so sure. You’ve shown that something is unjust or that this would be the reasonable way to proceed. But at the real-material level people are caught in sticky networks that suck them into life in particular ways. They ought, for example, to drive an electric car, but what if it’s not available where they are or what if they can’t afford it? Well they should do whatever they can to get it? But what of their other obligations such as eating, sheltering themselves, taking care of their children, paying their medical bills, etc? It would be so nice if we just had mistaken beliefs or failed to recognize the right norms. Things would be so easy then. But there’s life, there’s the power of things. Sometimes the issues aren’t ones of ideology– and yes, of course, I recognize that ideology is probably involved in making electric cars expensive and hard to obtain, but not for them always –sometimes they’re simply issues of the power of things. And if we treat things as blank screens we’ll have difficulty seeing this and we’ll miss out on other opportunities for engagement. Long ago I used to keep track of my blog. I had a map that showed me where all my visits were coming from about the world. I noticed that the interior portions of the United States were largely dark with no visits and that the coasts and cities had a high volume of traffic. Given that my blog talks about all sorts of things ranging from weather patterns to beavers to mantis shrimps to octopi (I get all these random visits from folks searching for these things), it followed that the absence of traffic from these regions of the country couldn’t be explained in terms of a lack of interest in French and continental philosophy (yes, I recognize that there are also cultural reasons folks from these reasons might shy away from such things). What then was it? I think the answer must be that there’s a lack easy and inexpensive internet access from these portions of the country. Notice also that these regions of the country are also the most conservative regions of the country. Could there be a relation between lack of access and conservatism? I am not suggesting that lack of access is the cause of conservatism and fundamentalism. Clearly there’s a whole history in these regions and an entire set of institutions that exercise a particular inertia. I’m saying that if the only voices you hear are those in your immediate community, how much opportunity is there to think and imagine otherwise? You’re only exposed to the orthodoxy of your community and their sanctions. I am also not saying that if you give people the internet they’ll suddenly become radical leftists. Minimally, however, they’ll have a vector of deterritorialization that allows them to escape the constraints of their local social field. All of this begs the question of who critique is for. If it can’t get to the audience that you want to change, what’s it actually doing? Who’s it addressed to? Sometimes you get the sense that the practice of radical political philosophy and critical theory is a bit like the Underpants Gnomes depicted in South Park: The Underpants Gnomes have a plan for success: collect underwear —>; ? [question mark] —->; profit. This is like our critical theorists: debunk/decipher —>; ? [question mark] —->; revolution! The problem is the question mark. We’re never quite sure what’s supposed to come between collecting the underwear and profit, between debunking and revolution. This suggests an additional form of political engagement. Sometimes the more radical gesture is not to debunk and critique, but to find ways to lay fiber optic cables, roads, plumbing, etc. How, for example, can a people rise up and overturn their fundamentalist dictators if they’re suffering from typhoid and cholera as a result of bad plumbing and waste disposal? How can people overturn capitalism when they have to support families and need places to live and have no alternative? Perhaps, at this point, we need a little less critique and a little more analysis of the things that are keeping people in place, the sticky networks or regimes of attraction. Perhaps we need a little more carpentry. This has real theoretical consequences. For example, we can imagine someone writing about sovereignty, believing they’re making a blow against nationalism by critiquing Schmitt and by discussing Agamben, all the while ignoring media of communication or paths of relation between geographically diverse people as if these things were irrelevant to nationalism occurring. Ever read Anderson on print culture and nationalism? Such a person should. Yet they seem to believe nationalism is merely an incorporeal belief that requires no discussion of material channels or media. They thereby deny themselves of all sorts of modes of intervention, hitching everything on psychology, attachment, and identification. Well done!

#### Sovereignty isn’t nearly as bad as they make it out to be. Discourses of the law’s violent underside omit its talent for getting stuff done. Making the trains run on time is how we get to debate tournaments. Recognizing this means we don’t have to resist—we can see rules as strategic.

Derrida ‘4 Jacques Derrida, Directeur d’Etudes at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris, and Professor of Philosophy, French and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Irvine, 2004, For What Tomorrow? A Dialogue With Elisabeth Roudinesco, p. 91-92

J.D.: A moment ago you spoke of regicide as the necessity of an ex­ception, in sum. Well, yes, one can refer provisionally to Carl Schmitt (whatever one may think of him, his arguments are always useful for prob­lematizing the “political” or the “juridical”; I examined this question in Pol­itics of Friendship). He says in effect that a sovereign is defined by his capacity to decide the exception. Sovereign is he who effectively decides the exception. The revolutionaries decided that at that moment that it was nec­essary to suspend justice and—in order to establish the law [droit] and to give the Revolution its rights—to suspend the rule of law [l’Etat de droit]. Schmitt also gives this definition of sovereignty: to have the right to sus­pend the law, or the rule of law, the constitutional state. Without this cate­gory of exception, we cannot understand the concept of sovereignty. Today, the great question is indeed, everywhere, that of sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, under its own name or another, liter­ally or figuratively, this concept has a theological origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority or of this power was transferred to the monarch, said to have a “divine right.” Sovereignty was then delegated to the people, in the form of democracy, or to the nation, with the same the­ological attributes as those attributed to the king and to God. Today, wher­ever the word “sovereignty” is spoken, this heritage remains undeniable, whatever internal differentiation one may recognize in it. How do we deal with this? Here we return to the question of heritage with which we began. It is necessary to deconstruct the concept of sover­eignty, never to forget its theological filiation and to be ready to call this fil­iation into question wherever we discern its effects. This supposes an in­flexible critique of the logic of the state and of the nation-state. And yet—hence the enormous responsibility of the citizen and of the heir in general, in certain situations—the state, in its actual form, can resist cer­tain forces that I consider the most threatening. What I here call “responsibility” is what dictates the decision to be sometimes for the sovereign state and sometimes against it, for its deconstruction (“theoretical and practical,” as one used to say) according to the singularity of the contexts and the stakes. There is no relativism in this, no renunciation of the injunction to “think” and to deconstruct the heritage. This aporia is in truth the very condition of decision and responsibility—if there is any. I am thinking for example of the incoherent but organized coalition of international capitalist forces that, in the name of neoliberalism or the market,31 are taking hold of the world in conditions such as the “state” form; this is what can still resist the most. For the moment. But it is neces­sary to reinvent the conditions of resistance. Once again, I would say that according to the situations, I am an antisovereignist or a sovereignist—and I vindicate the right to be antisovereignist at certain times and a sovereignist at others. No one can make me respond to this question as though it were a matter of pressing a button on some old-fashioned machine. There are cases in which I would support a logic of the state, but I ask to examine each situation before making any statement. It is also necessary to recognize that by requiring someone to be not unconditionally sovereignist but rather sovereignist only under certain conditions, one is already calling into question the principle of sovereignty. Deconstruction begins there. It demands a dif­ficult dissociation, almost impossible but indispensable, between uncondi­tionality (justice without power) and sovereignty (right, power, or potency). Deconstruction is on the side of unconditionaliry, even when it seems im­possible, and not sovereignty, even when it seems possible.

#### This is uniquely true in the context of the topic. It’s true that social barriers exist to responsible energy production—this just magnifies the importance of using deliberative education to explore mainstream perspectives on energy policy. This lays the practical basis for the necessary small steps to combat global warming.

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Getting to 350 parts per million CO2 in the atmosphere will require massive investments in clean-energy infrastructure—investments that can too often be foiled by a combination of special interests and political sclerosis. Take the recent approval of the Cape Wind project by the U.S. Department of the Interior. In some ways, this was great news for clean-energy advocates: the project’s 130 turbines will produce, on average, 170 megawatts of electricity, almost 75 percent of the average electricity demand for Cape Cod and the islands of Martha’s Vineyard and Nantucket.1 But, because of local opposition by well-organized opponents, the approval process was lengthy, costly, and grueling —and all for a project that will produce only 0.04 percent of the total (forecasted) U.S. electricity demand in 2010.2,3 Over the next few decades, the world will need thousands of large-scale, low-carbon electricity projects—wind, solar, and nuclear power will certainly be in the mix. But if each faces Cape Wind–like opposition, getting to 350 is unlikely. How can the decision-making process about such projects be streamlined so that public policy reflects the view of a well-informed majority, provides opportunities for legitimate critiques, but does not permit the opposition to retard the process indefinitely? One answer is found in a set of innovative policy-making tools founded on the principle of deliberative democracy, defined as “decision making by discussion among free and equal citizens.”4 Such approaches, which have been developed and led by the Center for Deliberative Democracy (cdd.stanford.edu), America Speaks (www.americaspeaks.org), and the Consensus Building Institute (cbuilding.org), among others, are gaining popularity by promising a new foothold for effective citizen participation in the drive for a clean-energy future. Deliberative democracy stems from the belief that democratic leadership should involve educating constituents about issues at hand, and that citizens may significantly alter their opinions when faced with information about these issues. Advocates of the approach state that democracy should shift away from fixed notions toward a learning process in which people develop defensible positions.5 While the approaches of the Center for Deliberative Democracy, America Speaks, and the Consensus Building Institute do differ, all of these deliberative methodologies involve unbiased sharing of information and public-policy alternatives with a representative set of citizens; a moderated process of deliberation among the selected citizens; and the collection and dissemination of data resulting from this process. For example, in the deliberative polling approach used by the Center for Deliberative Democracy, a random selection of citizens is first polled on a particular issue. Then, members of the poll are invited to gather at a single place to discuss the issue. Participants receive balanced briefing materials to review before the gathering, and at the gathering they engage in dialogue with competing experts and political leaders based on questions they develop in small group discussions. After deliberations, the sample is asked the original poll questions, and the resulting changes in opinion represent the conclusions that the public would reach if everyone were given the opportunity to become more informed on pressing issues.6 If policymakers look at deliberative polls rather than traditional polls, they will be able to utilize results that originate from an informed group of citizens. As with traditional polls, deliberative polls choose people at random to represent U.S. demographics of age, education, gender, and so on. But traditional polls stop there, asking the random sample some brief, simple questions, typically online or over the phone. However, participants of deliberative polls have the opportunity to access expert information and then talk with one another before voting on policy recommendations. The power of this approach is illustrated by the results of a global deliberative process organized by World Wide Views on Global Warming (www.wwviews.org), a citizen’s deliberation organization based in Denmark.7 On September 26, 2009, approximately 4,000 people gathered in 38 countries to consider what should happen at the UN climate change negotiations in Copenhagen (338 Americans met in five major cities). The results derived from this day of deliberation were dramatic and significantly different from results of traditional polls. Overall, citizens showed strong concern about global warming and support for climate-change legislation, contrary to the outcomes of many standard climate-change polls. Based on the polling results from these gatherings, 90 percent of global citizens believe that it is urgent for the UN negotiations to produce a new climate change agreement; 88 percent of global citizens (82 percent of U.S. citizens) favor holding global warming to within 2 degrees Celsius of pre-industrial levels; and 74 percent of global citizens (69 percent of U.S. citizens) favor increasing fossil-fuel prices in developed countries. However, a typical news poll that was conducted two days before 350.org’s International Day of Climate Action on October 24, 2009, found that Americans had an overall declining concern about global warming.7 How can deliberative democracy help to create solutions for the climate-change policy process, to accelerate the kinds of policies and public investments that are so crucial to getting the world on a path to 350? Take again the example of wind in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the Texas Public Utilities Commission (PUC) launched an “integrated resource plan” to develop long-term strategies for energy production, particularly electricity.8 Upon learning about the deliberative polling approach of James Fishkin (then at the University of Texas at Austin), the PUC set up deliberative sessions for several hundred customers in the vicinity of every major utility provider in the state. The results were a surprise: it turned out that participants ranked reliability and stability of electricity supply as more important characteristics than price. In addition, they were open to supporting renewable energy, even if the costs slightly exceeded fossil-fuel sources. Observers considered this a breakthrough: based on these public deliberations, the PUC went on to champion an aggressive renewable portfolio standard, and the state has subsequently experienced little of the opposition to wind-tower siting that has slowed development in other states.8 By 2009, Texas had 9,500 megawatts of installed wind capacity, as much as the next six states (ranked by wind capacity) in the windy lower and upper Midwest (Iowa, Minnesota, Colorado, North Dakota, Kansas, and New Mexico).9 Deliberative democracy has proven effective in a wide range of countries and settings. In the Chinese township of Zeguo, a series of deliberative polls has helped the Local People’s Congress (LPC) to become a more effective decision-making body.10 In February 2008, 175 citizens were randomly selected to scrutinize the town’s budget—and 60 deputies from the LPC observed the process. After the deliberations, support decreased for budgeting for national defense projects, while support rose for infrastructure (e.g., rural road construction) and environmental protection. Subsequently, the LPC increased support for environmental projects by 9 percent.10 In decades to come, China must be at the forefront of the world’s investments in clean-energy infrastructure. The experience of Zeguo, if scaled up and fully supported by Chinese leaders, can help to play an important role. Deliberative democracy offers one solution for determining citizen opinions, including those on pressing issues related to climate change and clean energy. If democracy is truly about representing popular opinion, policymakers should seek out deliberative polls in their decision-making process.

### 1NC—The Postmodern Opiate

#### Corporatization and environmental degradation are fundamentally issues of production. Their analysis of public discourse over coal mining omits the socio-historical processes which make resource degradation necessary—namely, the division of labor which centralizes wealth and productive power in the hands of the few.

Magdoff ’12 Fred Magdoff, Professor emeritus of plant and soil science at the Unviersity of Vermont, “Harmony and Ecological Civilization,” Monthly Review, June 2012, Vol. 64, Issue 2, p. 1-9

Nevertheless, for many the role that capitalism plays in ecological destruction is invisible. Thus the ecological and social antagonisms and contradictions of capitalism are frequently misdiagnosed. Some observers suggest that many of these problems are caused by the rise of industrial society. Here, so the thinking goes, any society based on or using industrial production will necessarily have the same resource and environmental problems. Others blame the thoughtless exploitation of natural resources and the great damage done to the environment on the existence of too many people. The large population, exceeding the carrying capacity of the planet, they maintain, is the culprit and the solution is therefore to reduce the population of the earth as quickly as possible. (Not easy to do of course by humane means.) Some ahistorical commentators say the problem is endemic to humans because we are inherently greedy and acquisitive. With a few important exceptions, non-Marxist discussions of the problems neglect to even look at the characteristics and workings of capitalism, let alone examine them at any depth. They are so embedded in the system, that they assume that capitalism, which many mislabel “the market economy,” will go on and on forever—even, it is illogically assumed, if we destroy the earth itself as a place of human habitation—while any other type of economic system is absolutely inconceivable. Economic, societal, and historical contexts are completely ignored. Rational and useful alternative solutions to any problem depend upon a realistic analysis and diagnosis as to what is causing it to occur. When such analysis is lacking substance the proposed “solutions” will most likely be useless. For example, there are people fixated on nonrenewable resource depletion that is caused, in their opinion, by “overpopulation.” Thus, they propose, as the one and only “solution,” a rapid “degrowth” of the world’s population. Programs that provide contraceptives to women in poor countries are therefore offered as an important tool to solving the global ecological problem. However, those concerned with there being too many people generally do not discuss the economic system that is so destructive to the environment and people or the critical moral and practical issue of the vast inequalities created by capitalism. Even the way that capitalism itself requires population growth as part of its overall expansion is ignored. Thus, a critical aspect almost always missing from discussions by those concerned with population as it affects resource use and pollution is that the overwhelming majority of the earth’s environmental problems are caused by the wealthy and their lifestyles—and by a system of capital accumulation that predominantly serves their interests. The World Bank staff estimates that the wealthiest 10 percent of humanity are responsible for approximately 60 percent of all resource use and therefore 60 percent of the pollution (most probably an underestimate). Commentators fixated on nonrenewable resources and pollution as the overriding issues cannot see that one of their main “solutions”—promoting birth control in poor countries—gets nowhere near to even beginning to address the real problem. It should go without saying that poor people should have access to medical services, including those involving family planning. This should be considered a basic human right. The rights of women in this respect are one of the key indicators of democratic and human development. But how can people fixated on the mere population numbers ignore the fact that it is the world’s affluent classes that account for the great bulk of those problems—whether one is looking at resource use, consumption, waste, or environmental pollution—that are considered so important to the survival of society and even humanity? In addition to the vast quantity of resources used and pollution caused by wealthy individuals, governments are also responsible. The U.S. military is one of the world’s prime users of resources—from oil to copper, zinc, tin, and rare earths. The military is also is the single largest consumer of energy in the United States.5 While capitalism creates many of the features and relationships discussed above, we must keep in mind that long before capitalism existed there were negative societal aspects such as warfare, exploitation of people and resources, and ecological damage. However, capitalism solidifies and makes these problems systemic while at the same time creating other negative aspects.

#### Their discursive framing is backwards—ideology and consumption patterns are determined by material inequalities. Identity theory cedes politics by reducing praxis to flimsy ‘transgressive’ speech acts like the 1AC

Tumino ‘8 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, "Materiality in Contemporary Cultural Theory," The Red Critique, Fall/Winter 2008, accessed 1/21/10 http://www.redcritique.org/FallWinter2008/materialityincontemporaryculturaltheory.htm

One of the mainstays of contemporary cultural theory is the argument that the social is primarily shaped by culture. Culture, that is, not as a collection of artifacts or an archive of progress, but, rather, following the writings of Antonio Gramsci, as "an arena of consent and resistance" (Stuart Hall, "Deconstructing" 239) over the shape of the social. Contemporary cultural theory has extended the understanding of culture beyond universalist, and, therefore, supposedly elitist assumptions and normative hegemonic conclusions about culture and instead focused on culture as "the articulation and activation of meaning" (Storey xiii) on the grounds that it is primarily discourse that possesses "the power and the authority to define social reality" (xii). The meaning(s) in a culture that secure and contest the dominant social arrangements are thought to lie in what Michel de Certeau calls "secondary production" (xiii), the sphere of consumption, rather than the economic sphere of production. In these terms, it is the "consumer who in effect 'produces in use'" (xiii) the meaning(s) of the culture that determines social reality. So much has such a focus on the daily practices of consumption and identification been "central to the project of cultural studies" (xi) that some have simply argued that "cultural studies could be described ... perhaps more accurately as ideological studies" (James Carey qtd. in Storey xii). The focus in cultural theory on the constitutive power of discourse to define social reality has shifted the attention of cultural studies from the wider social relations of production which shape ideology and consumption and in fact determine the social real, toward a market theory of culture which valorizes the excessive "uses" and "resignifications" of cultural commodities and in doing so transforms the subject of labor into the subject of consumption who, far from intervening into global capital, supports it through "resistant" desires and "rebellious" acts of consumption. Cultural theory, in other words, rests on the assumption that consumption determines production rather than the other way around. People's "lifestyles" (which is another way of referring to the commodities they consume and how they consume them) are thus assumed to be more significant, in these terms, than the labor relations they must enter into as a necessary precondition of consumption. Such an assumption concludes that the markers and beliefs that position individuals in culture as men and women, black, latino, gay,… are more important than the fact that they are wage workers that must first sell themselves daily to capital before they can acquire the cultural markers of identity. Such an understanding of the priority of the economic is seen on the cultural left as "left conservatism" (Butler, Bové, et. al.) because it forecloses on differences. But as Teresa Ebert has explained, "differences in class societies are always exploitative" (169) because they serve to divide and segment the working class and foster competition between the workers. At the core of the labor theory of culture is the explanation of how culturalism itself has an economic basis in the division of labor – and more specifically, in the crisis of overproduction that is endemic to capitalism since the 1970s—and reflects the interests of those who having had their material needs already met from the labor of the other can afford to focus on their desires in the market.

#### Capital reduces staggeringly large populations to servility at the whim of multinational corporations, formenting widespread social instability—the only hope for the world is fundamental economic change

Foster and McChesney ’12 John Bellamy Foster, professor of sociology at University of Oregon, and Robert W. McChesney, Gutgsell Endowed Professor of Communication, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign, “The Endless Crisis,” Monthly Review, May 2012, vol. 64, issue 1, pp. 1-28

The biggest question mark generated by this new phase of accumulation today is the rapid growth of a few large emerging economies, particularly China and India. The vagaries of an accumulation system in these countries based on the exploitation of massive reserve armies of workers (in China a “floating population” of peasants) in the hundreds of millions, which cannot be absorbed internally through the standard industrialization process, makes the future of the new Asia uncertain. The imperial rent exacted by multinationals, who also control the global supply chains, means that emerging economies face what may appear to be an open door to the world market, but must proceed along paths controlled from outside.74 The vast inequality built into a model of export-oriented development based on low-wage labor creates internal fault lines for emerging economies. China is now the site of continual mass protests, occurring on a scale of hundreds of thousands annually. In an article entitled “Is China Ripe for Revolution?” in the February 12, 2012 New York Times, Stephen R. Platt wrote that the Taiping Rebellion of the nineteenth century might stand as a historical reminder of the possibility of another major “revolution from within” in that country (in which case, he notes, Washington would mostly likely find itself “hoping for that revolution to fail”).75 In many ways the world situation, with minor modifications, conforms to the diagnosis provided by Che Guevara at the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria in 1965: “Ever since monopoly capital took over the world, it has kept the greater part of humanity in poverty, dividing all the profits among the group of the most powerful countries…. There should be no more talk about developing mutually beneficial trade based on prices forced on the backward countries by the law of value and the international relations of unequal exchange that result from the law of value.”76 If some emerging economies are now developing rapidly, the dominant reality is the global labor arbitrage that is increasing the level of exploitation worldwide, the greatest burden of which is falling on the global South. An underlying premise throughout our analysis is that imperialist divisions within the world remain and are even deepening, enforcing wide disparities in living conditions. Still, in the age of global monopoly-finance capital working people everywhere are increasingly suffering—a phenomenon that Michael Yates has referred to as “The Great Inequality.”77 Entrenched and expanding monopolies of wealth, income, and power are aimed at serving the interests of a miniscule portion of the world population, now known as the 1%—or the global ruling classes of contemporary monopoly-finance capital. The world is being subjected to a process of monopolistic capital accumulation so extreme and distorted that not only has it produced the Great Inequality and conditions of stagnation and financial instability, but also the entire planet as a place of human habitation is being put in peril in order to sustain this very system.78 Hence, the future of humanity—if there is to be one at all—now lies with the 99%. “If the system itself is at fault,” Gar Alperovitz observes in his America Beyond Capitalism, “then self evidently—indeed, by definition—a solution would ultimately require the development of a new system.”79

#### The 1AC's understanding of progress and power is disastrous - attempts to liberate transgendered individuals make the mistake of basing emancipation in localized, identity-based movements. Local politics, however, are just another manifestation of capitalism - the local is inevitably tied to and manipulated by global structures, meaning the aff is co-opted and redeployed to fracture resistance to capital and disable class consciousness.

Hennessy 2k Rosemary Hennessy, Professor of English and Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Gender, and Sexuality at Rice University, Profit and Pleasure: Sexual Identities in Late Capitalism, 2000, pp. 8-9, Questia

Late capitalism’s new economic, political, and cultural structures have also intensified the relationship between global and local situations. Global transnational corporations rely on localities of many sorts as sites for capital accumulation through production, marketing, and knowledgemaking. Global-localism has become both the paradigm of production and an explicit new strategy by which the corporation infiltrates various localities without forfeiting its global aims (Dirlik 34). From corporate headquarters, CEOs orchestrate the incorporation of particular localities into the demands of global capital at the same time that the corporation is domesticated into the local society. Thus it is in the interests of global capitalism to celebrate and enhance awareness of local communities, cultures, and forms of identification. But this cannot be done in a way that makes evident their exploitation, that is, in a way that makes visible the real material relationship between the global and the local (Dirlik 35). Against capitalism’s penetration of local communities, many “local” groups—indigenous people’s movements, ethnic and women’s organizations, lesbian, gay, and transgender rights movements—have presented themselves as potential sites for liberation struggles. Undoubtedly, these struggles have indeed accomplished changes that have enhanced the quality of life for countless people. But the celebration of “the local” as a self-defined space for the affirmation of cultural identity and the formation of political resistance often also play into late capitalism’s opportunistic use of local-izing—not just as an arrangement of production but also as a structure of knowing. The turn to “the local” has also been the characteristic talisman of a postmodern culture and politics that has repudiated the totalizing narratives of modernity. The claims of indigenous and ethnic groups, of women, and of lesbian and gay people have been an important part of postmodern challenges to the adequacy of cultural narratives—among them enlightened humanism and Eurocentric scholarship—that do not address the histories of subaltern peoples. However, insofar as their counter-narratives put forward an alternative that de-links the interests of particular social groups from the larger collective that they are part of, they tend to promote political projects that keep the structures of capitalism invisible.

#### Capital universalizes itself to swallow any possible outside from which the aff could construct a new identity—only the anonymous universality of the proletariat resists the logic of capital

Lissovoy ‘8

Noah De Lissovoy, “Dialectic of Emergency/Emergency of the Dialectic,” Capitalism Nature Socialism, vol. 19 iss. 1, pp. 27-40, 2008, 10.1080/10455750701859380

Without a true distinction between inside and outside, there is no inner space of pure truth, no undistorted essence that can be counterposed to a false or inauthentic surface. Instead, alienation can be seen as always already sealed into the very categories and fact of existence within capitalism rather than representing a mere distortion of human being or a subversion of an original wholeness. Thus, Moishe Postone argues that the categories of value and labor themselves are the necessary object of critique in Marxism-i.e., that what has to be critiqued is the totality of capital as ontology rather than simply the maldistribution of social goods or the experience of estrangement, which are its consequences. Postone gives a contemporary twist to the idea that identities do not preserve an inner authenticity against their incorporation by capital but become identities by virtue of this incorporation.29 On this basis, we can understand crisis not as an effect of the distance between a potential authenticity within the economies of self and society and the actual violation of this potential by capitalism, but rather as indicating the tentative intrusion into capital of the obscure forms of a social universe that lies beyond it, and which it cannot comprehend. This is the universe of human autonomy and democratic collectivity, which from the point of view of power can only show up as riot and refusal, or as the fraying and exhaustion of its own categories. This destabilization or interruption is connected to the threat posed by emerging global social movements. These movements are characterized not only by the assertion of rights of citizenship under national (or international) constitutions, nor (simply) by the demand by workers for a fair price for their labor power, but also by a challenge to the discursive framework of global politics. They represent the first flickers of the appearance of a form of life that is inconceivable and imperceptible within the present. The threat that such movements pose to power is that they begin to withdraw social content (actors, territories, forces) from the order of the real as it is organized, and so menace capital with an implosion of the space of its own meaning and possibility. For example, the indigenous movements that have emerged as the central historical force in Bolivia and elsewhere in Latin America represent the appearance of a subject that was not reckoned on, even as antagonist, in capital's imaginary. Capital can only blame itself for this surprise: in its drive to colonize every "periphery" and exploit distant and non-traditional sources of labor power, capital awakens forces and histories that are not reducible to the forms of class contradiction that it has learned to manage. These movements do not primarily threaten the legitimacy of power within the rational economy of communicative action; instead, they threaten the very intelligibility of capital and the universe that it materializes. This threat extends to the forms of identification available to subjects as they become "unmoor[ed]" from "traditional sources of identity" and are instead rearticulated on a global terrain.31

#### Vote negative in favor of classist politics

#### Revolutionary theory is a prior question—the aff is irrelevant in the grand scheme of capitalism—we should instead affirm the historical necessity of communism

Tumino ’12 Stephen Tumino, more marxist than Marx himself, “Is Occupy Wall Street Communist,” Red Critique 14, Winter/Spring 2012, http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2012/isoccupywallstreetcommunist.htm

Leaving aside that the purpose of Wolff's speech was to popularize a messianic vision of a more just society based on workplace democracy, he is right about one thing: Marx's original contribution to the idea of communism is that it is an historical and material movement produced by the failure of capitalism not a moral crusade to reform it. Today we are confronted with the fact that capitalism has failed in exactly the way that Marx explained was inevitable.[4] It has "simplified the class antagonism" (The Communist Manifesto); by concentrating wealth and centralizing power in the hands of a few it has succeeded in dispossessing the masses of people of everything except their labor power. As a result it has revealed that the ruling class "is unfit to rule," as The Communist Manifesto concludes, "because it is incompetent to assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him." And the slaves are thus compelled to fight back. Capitalism makes communism necessary because it has brought into being an international working class whose common conditions of life give them not only the need but also the economic power to establish a society in which the rule is "from each according to their ability, to each according to their need" (Marx, Critique of the Gotha Programme). Until and unless we confront the fact that capitalism has once again brought the world to the point of taking sides for or against the system as a whole, communism will continue to be just a bogey-man or a nursery-tale to frighten and soothe the conscience of the owners rather than what it is—the materialist theory that is an absolute requirement for our emancipation from exploitation and a new society freed from necessity! As Lenin said, "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement" (What Is To Be Done?). We are confronted with an historic crisis of global proportions that demands of us that we take Marxism seriously as something that needs to be studied to find solutions to the problems of today. Perhaps then we can even begin to understand communism in the way that The Communist Manifesto presents it as "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority" to end inequality forever.

#### Evaluate the debate as a dialectical materialist—you are a historian inquiring into the determinant factors behind the 1AC—Marx’s labor theory of value is the best possible description

Tumino ‘1 Stephen Tumino, professor of English at the University of Pittsburgh, “What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before,” Red Critique, Spring 2001, http://redcritique.org/spring2001/whatisorthodoxmarxism.htm

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory. Finally, it is only Orthodox Marxism that recognizes the inevitability and also the necessity of communism—the necessity, that is, of a society in which "from each according to their ability to each according to their needs" (Marx) is the rule.

### Om Nom I’m Hungry

#### IN ANCIENT TIMES crisis was met not with calls to consensus and policy changes but rather with brutal public SACRIFICE of the bodypolitic. To stave off the inevitable crop failure, people sacrificed the farmers who failed to provide in the hopes that the gods would love the blood of the failures; To stave off a war with a nation warriors and priests would consume the HEARTS of the enemy in the hopes that the gods would grant them power and space.

#### Liberal-industrial society always proceeds with the opposite approach: To flee from the problem in the hopes that it would simply disappear.

#### THIS IS THE BODY OF THE ENEMY, DRIPPING WITH THE BLOOD OF THEIR TORN-OUT HEART. [HOLD UP PLAN] WE WILL NOW CONSUME THE HEART OF THE ENEMY IN AN ACT OF VIOLENT PUBLIC SACRIFICE. [EAT THAT PLAN]

#### The tragedy of this public sacrifice allows for a genuine relationship to the horrors of the 1AC. In the act of violent sacrifice, we ourselves become the victim: The brutal murder masks a deeper ontological connection with the victim, collapsing all metaphysical boundaries between self and other. We enter a space of radical liminality and de-limination, where in flaying the affirmative’s flesh, we also dance in their sinful skins. Immortality is found only in the death of the Other.

Allison 9 [David, Professor of Philosophy, The Obssessions of George Bataille: Community and "Communication ed. Mitchell/Winfree p. 122-123, 127 CJQ]"

To communicate with another is to break through his integrity, his independence, his autonomy, his nature‑to intrude upon him, unsettle him, wound him. Communication takes place when beings put themselves at risk, each putting himself and the other in the region of death and nothingness. Communication is suicidal and criminal.  It is striking that the longing to communicate with those most unlike ourselves‑with sacred and demonic beings‑so dominates ancient humanity. The outer zone where the sphere of work and reason comes to an end is the sacred‑‑sacrum, "separated.”  Sacrifice‑of goods, other animals, even of our firstborn children‑‑is the most significant of all human acts (OC 2: 1 3/VE 73). It is as fundamental as the satisfaction of needs. The word sacrifice‑sacrum ficio‑‑‑etymologically means "to make sacred.” In a sacrifice something supremely precious‑our finest harvest and livestock, our firstborn son-\_is set aside from all use, separated absolutely from the profane sphere. What is set apart from all profane use is separated absolutely, definitively, in being destroyed.  The knife that tears open the body of the sacrificial victim, tears apart his protective hide or skin that kept him functioning, releasing blood and the writhing turmoil of spilt organs, reveals the violence of a stag or boar taken from the wilderness, the inner violence of its life, reveals anonymous untamed forces in the child. The shaman, the priest, Abraham penetrates into the sacred zone, and there, in the violence of the knife and consuming fire, sacrifice reveals the sacred.  The sacrificial priest leaves the profane sphere to perform the sacrifice and act in the name of the people who identify with his act. Bringing to him of their harvest and livestock, the beast of the wilderness, or their firstborn child, they participate in his deed.  Those who perform sacrifice identify themselves with the victim. The[p. 123] Aztec priests covered themselves with the blood of the sacrificial victims, excoriated them, and pulled the skin of the victims over their own naked bodies. And we who consign to the sacred sphere our resources, the game from our hunt, our own children, identify with them, identify with the victims. The stag or wild boar sacrificed would have sustained and nourished us, How could we not identify with our own firstborn child, sacrificed to the mountain god Jahweh? At the moment of the blood sacrifice, the participants find their own identity plunged into the void. When the fire blazes upon a sacred victim, it blazes too on us.  We slash open, crucify, or burn in holocaust the divine force that has been revealed in the sacrificial victim. The slashings and fire we inflict on what is precious to us‑our finest livestock and harvest, our firstborn son wounds us irremediably. We communicate with wounds inflicted and self‑inflicted. The communication takes place between humans and sacred beings, each rent, wounded, exposed to one another by their wounds. God and humans communicate in the violation of the integrity of their natures, in crime. Tragedies, whether the real tragedies of individuals or those represented in tragic theater, hold us in anxiety and in fascination. Our energies are expended in contact with terrifying cataclysms of nature and with individuals torn asunder, whose agonies rend our self‑sufficiency. Tears and grieving disconnect the future and recognize that the force and meaning of the past have come to an end. The forces of life hold on with strength and will to the present with all its irrevocable loss, inconsolable with words and projects. Tragic art holds humans in thrall to losses that they themselves have not known.  Communication occurs when doctors, nurses, and truck drivers go to the 50 million people today displaced by wars and famine, to perform surgeries in dusty tents, distribute sacks of food, nurse children dying of AIDS. [p. 127] "What seems 'faultless' and stable‑a whole that has a look of completion (house, person, street, landscape or sky). The 'fault,' or defect can appear though" (OC 5: 266/C 30). They, too are incomplete. They are not crystallizations in the intersections of the universal laws of the universe. "On the same level you find‑the ridiculous universe, a naked woman, and torment" (OC 5: 267/C 31).  In current language, communication strongly denotes communication among humans; but Walter Benjamin found biologists wondering whether in fact all animate organisms communicate, whether communication belongs to the nature of animate organisms. However, communication there meant the transmission of information. In Being and Time, Heidegger, replacing the substantive account of things with the relational account of implements, reduces things to the force that informs the user. The term communication, as Bataille uses it, to denote the contact of a sovereign being with what is other, is first the communication with the sacred and demonic; it is also communication with other species, inanimate things, the material universe. It is with our incompleteness, our orifices gaping open, and our unanswerable questions that we communicate with a world out of joint, spread about us disconnected, a concatenation of riddles, fragments, and dreadful accidents.' Indeed, communication with the sacred and with natural things is prior to communication with other humans.